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Audiovisual records of a Project Mercury pilot's activities during
an orbital flight indicate that his visor was left open during reentry and
descent to the sea surface, phases of flight during which cabin pressure
loss was to be mitigated by suit pressurization; however the suit could
not have been pressurized with the visor open. Thus, for a presently-
unknown reason, a critical safety step—sealing the visor and making a
pressure suit integrity test before re-entry—was overlooked in this flight,
a  fact  itself  unreported  in  any  flight  review  or  historical  documents
known  to  the  author.  The  lesson  is  clear:  even  a  highly-motivated,
federally-funded project remains at base a collaboration of individuals,
the project only being as strong as the proverbial weakest link. Attention
to development of thorough and unambiguous procedural checklists is
reiterated.  
1. Introduction
In  several  years  of  independently  designing,
building  and  testing  launch-entry  pressure  garments,  the
Pacific  Spaceflight  research  group  have  learned  the
essential nature of accurate and thorough checklists in the
use  of  such  technology.  When  systems  are  formalized,
checklists  are  relatively  straightforward  to  produce,  but
when  technologies  are  being  developed,  checklists  must
change often to track varying system configurations and test
objectives  This  highlights  the  problem  of  'checklist
complacency'  in  which  checklist  items  are  skipped  when
operators feel they are familiar with checklists.
Adhering to checklists is less difficult, as they form
the essential 'script' of our pressurized garment tests. Still,
checklist  adherence  remains  a  difficulty  in  all  levels  of
aviation, for reasons including flight crew fatigue, checklist
illegibility,  aircrew  confusion  of  checklist  sequences  and
meanings, and others [1].
In reviewing audiovisual records of Project Mercury
spaceflights,  and  their  audio  transcripts,  the  author  has
identified  a  case  of  a  Mercury  astronaut  not  closing  his
pressure garment visor during reentry; this was a phase of
flight  in  which  ambient  atmospheric  pressure  (exterior  to
pressure cabin) were lethally low (effectively hard vacuum),
and the pressure garment was worn precisely as a backup
in the event of pressure cabin pressure loss. This means
that in this case, had a cabin pressure breach occurred, the
pressure  garment  would  not  have  been  able  to  fulfill  its
essential  function  of  keeping  the  astronaut's  body  at  a
physiologically-perceived safe, low altitude, in terms of both
gas pressure and composition. At some point, the checklist
system here failed, as did the pilot's situational awareness
and  that  of  the  ground  team  who  monitored  his  voice
transmissions closely; nobody noticed that some time after
about  1  hour  into  the  roughly  five-hour  flight,  the  pilot
opened his pressure suit visor, and left it open through the
reentry phase. Evidence for this is given in section  2, and
the implications discussed in section 3.
2. Video and Audio Transcript Evidence
Review of The Mercury 6 (06 February 1962, four-
orbit  Mercury flight)  cockpit  footage [2]  reveals  the open-
visor  on  reentry  episode.  Table  1 and  Figures 2  –  9
supplement the table.
For  familiarization  with  the  helmet  in  question,
Figure 1 displays the fiberglass-shell, polycarbonate -visor
helmet to the modified Navy Mark V pressure garment. In
Figure 1a, the helmet visor is up, leaving a distinctive black
sealing ring or gasket visible around the perimeter of the
face opening; this is seen again in Figure 1b. 
In Figure 2, the pilot is listening to the transmission
from the ground (row two of Table 1 at 00:04:44), “Twenty
seconds to SECO  (supplementary  engine cutoff).”;  at  this
time, the helmet visor is clearly down, with the black sealing
strip noted in Figure 1a and Figure 1b obscured by a metal
cover  visible in Figures 1a.
At 00:16:35 into the flight, the pilot reports a cabin
pressure  of  5.7psi  and  a  suit  pressure  of  5.8psi;  these
figures are correct for the flight plan, indicating a pressure
reduction  (from  14.7psi  ambient  at  launch)  to  c.5psi
minimum during orbit; the extra 0.1psi in the suit at this point
is expected, as while the suit was not meant to be flown fully
pressurized,  the  experience  of  Pacific  Spaceflight  tst
subjects  is  universally  that  about  1/10th  of  one  psi  is  a
comfortable suit pressure to keep the helmet off the head
and  the  suit  material  slightly  away  from  the  body,  This
pressure  in  the  suit  cannot  be  maintained  with  the  visor
open,  so  though  there  is  no  video  footage  of  this
transmission,  the  numbers  indicate  that  at  this  point  the
visor was closed and sealed.
In Figure 3a, the pilot is opening the visor to take a
xylose (sugar) pill about 22 minutes into the flight. In Figure
3b, the pill is being consumed, and in Figure 4 the visor is
closed again, just a few seconds after it was opened to take
the sugar pill.
At  00:52:00,  CAPCOM asks  the  pilot  to  confirm
that  his  visor  is  closed  (line  five  of  Table  1);  the  pilot
confirms this, indicating that he was closing the visor as it
had been opened for some unreported time. At 01:13:09 the
pilot  reports  opening  the  visor  to  eat;  somewhat  over  a
minute later,  he reports  having eaten (applesauce from a
tube) and that he is again closing the helmet visor.
The next video footage pertinent to the subject of
this brief is seen at 04:33:09, during the deorbit burn; here
(see Figure 5) the visor is clearly open, with no metal band
covering the black sealing strip identified in other Figures.
Figures 6, 7, 8 and 9 – all time-stamped to altitudes
between orbit and 7,000 feet – show an open visor. Viewing
the continuous video footage through this period shows that
the visor remained open though deorbit  burn and landing
[2].  Figure 10 shows the Mercury 3 pilot with visor clearly
down  at  50,000  feet  (video  derived  from cockpit  camera
record  archived  at  https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=4LziZpAmMy8); the helmet worn here did not differer from
that worn by the Mercury 6 pilot discussed in this report.
3. Discussion
Why was the  helmet  visor  left  open through the
reentry phase of the Mercury 6 mission?
The  reason  might  be  simple  oversight;   the
Mercury 6 Flight Plan [3] contains numerous checklists for
the  flight,  reentry  and  pickup  phases  of  the  mission.  As
described below, most do not carry explicit  instructions to
close the visor before reentry. Specifically,  the Flight Plan
Checklists  were:  1.  BECO (booster  engine  cutoff;  e.g.
jettison emergency tower),  2., SECO (supplemental engine
cutoff, e.g. periscope out, spot booster, report on tumbling
sensations and 0g sensations), 3. Orbit Checklist (various
switch  settings,  none  related  to  life  support),  4.  Control
Systems  Check (checking  control  performance  against
expected performance),  5. Yaw Maneuver Check (perform
a yaw maneuver, and then stabilize all rates to zero) and 6,
Equipment  Stowage (stowing  away  flashlight,  cameras
and other loose items prior to reentry). Life support systems
and the helmet visor  position are not mentioned in these
lists.  In  the  immediate  pre-deorbit  and  reentry  phase
checklists there is also no mention of the helmet visor or
other life support matters: in [3] page 80, Reference List 7,
Preretrosequence Checklist, the items are 1. Equipment –
STOWED, 2. Control System – CHECK (thruster warmup),
3.  Emergency  Retro  Sequence  fuse  switch  –  NO.  1,  4.
Transmit Switch – UHF, 5. Retro Man fuse switch – NO. 1,
6.  Restraint  Devices – CHECK, 7.  Crosscheck  Attitude –
Window/Instruments/Scope and 8. Time check CET.  It  is
only in Reference List 9 [3] page 82, Post-Entry Checklist,
that we see mention of the visor status: item 9 is 'Astronaut
preparation  for  landing'  and  item  9d  is  Disconnect  Visor
Seal hose followed by 9e, Open visor. These item 9 items
are to be carried out after item 8, which is to check main
parachute deployment visually, at an altitude of 10,000 feet.
Since the visor position was not listed in these checklists, its
status might not have been checked; however, as Figure 10
indicates, other mission pilots did not leave the visor open
through descent and landing. 
A possible  contributing  reason  for  this  oversight
might be imprecision in terminology; while most documents
refer to the visor as a visor, the Mercury 6 pilot once refers
to the visor as the 'faceplate' (at Mission Elapsed Time of
00:21:59; see [4]). Such discrepancies lead to uncertainties
in our experience, but precisely how such would play out in
this circumstance is unclear.
A second, more morbid reason for not sealing the
visor is possible; the pilot of this flight was told to leave the
the  retrorocket  pack  attached  to  his  spacecraft  during
descent,  for  a  number  of  technical  reasons  beyond  the
scope of this paper; the gist of the matter is that the pilot
was aware of a major departure from the flight plan in this
respect, and might have suspected that his heat shield was
damaged, as was suspected by the ground team, but not
communicated to the pilot. In this case, it might be that the
pilot made a decision to leave the visor open in the event of
a cabin pressure breach, suspecting that one would attend
any destruction of the space capsule if the heat shield were
indeed damaged. The pilot has not reported on this matter
in public, and it is mentioned here only as a speculation in
possibility.
In any case, it is clear that between 01:14:30 and
04:33:09 Mission Elapsed Time, the Mercury 6 pilot opened
the pressure garment visor,  after which time he does not
appear  to  close  it  again.  Loss  of  cabin  pressure  –  the
contingency the pressure suit was worn to protect against –
would likely have been lethal with the visor open through the
bulk  of  the  descent,  with  time  of  useful  consciousness
anywhere above 40,000 feet MSL measured in less than 15
seconds [5] (in one case of likely helmet pressure breach, at
c.51,000  feet  MSL the  pilot  was  heard  to  exhale  briefly
before losing consciousness, and was unable to make even
the simple motion of resealing the visor with an arm and
hand motion [6]).
4. Conclusion
Vigilance with correct use of terms, development of
unambiguous  and  thorough  checklists  and  adherence  to
these checklists is as critical to the successful operation of
pressure garments as to the operation of aircraft.  
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Table 1. Audiovisual and Transcript Evidence. MET = Mission Elapsed Time (time from instant of 
liftoff), ALTITUDE MSL = Flight Plan Altitude at Given MET, in Feet Above Mean Sea Level (MSL), AMBIENT PRESS =
ambient atmospheric pressure, TRANSMISSION = Transmission from Pilot to Ground (P) or Ground to Pilot ('Capcom' 
or CC), VISOR = Visor status, Open or Closed; based on video frame at time of indicated transmission.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MET ALTITUDE AMBIENT TRANSMISSION VISOR        FIG
MSL PRESSURE 
00:04:44 >15,000' <8.0PSI CC: 'Roger 20 seconds to SECO.” Closed         2
29:19
00:16:35 in orbit <0.000psi P:”...Cabin pressure holding steady at 5.7 [psi]... Closed         -
c.130mi suit pressure is indicating 5.8.” no video
00:21:59 in orbit <0.000psi P:” ...preferring to take xylose pill at present time... Opening       3,4
c.130mi Unsealing the, going to unseal the faceplate. Over.” at 33:55,
closing at 
34:02
00:52:00 in orbit <0.000psi CC: “Roger. You do have your visor closed -
c.130mi at this time [asking for confirmation]. Over. “
00:52:03 in orbit <0.000psi P: That is affirmative. I had it open for a little while; Closed          -
c.130mi it's closed now. Cabin pressure is holding in good no video
shape. Over.
01:13:09 in orbit <0.000psi P: “This is Friendship Seven. Opening visor, going Opening       -
c.130mi to eat, over.” no video
01:14:30 in orbit <0.000psi P: “This is Friendship Seven. Have eaten one tube Closing        -
c.130mi of food, shutting the visor.” no video
04:33:09 c.360,000' <0.000psi P: “Roger, retros are firing.” Open          5
44:10
04:43:47 >100,000' <0.016psi P: “This is Friendship Seven. A real fireball outside.” Open          6
47:56
04:47:55 c.100,000' c.0.016psi P: “My condition is good but that was a real Open          7
fireball, boy.” 50:16
04:48:07 80,000' 0.40psi P: “Altimeter off the peg indicating eight zero Open          8
thousand [ft MSL].” 50:29
04:49:20 c.30,000 ' 4.3psi P:“...drogue [parachute] came out at 30,000...” Open          9
51:06
04:52:14 <7,000' c.11psi P: “Friendship Seven, going through [landing] No            -
(safe) checklist...” video
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FIGURE 1. Mercury 6 Pilot Wearing Pressure Helmet. In (a) the helmet visor is open, 
revealing a distinctive black sealing strip around the perimeter of the face opening; this is 
better seen in (b). 1a derives from a NASA image at http://www.nasa.gov/content/astronaut-
john-glenn-at-cape-canaveral. 1b is derived from [3].
a
b
FIGURE 2. Mercury 6 Pilot at 20 Seconds to SECO, Visor Closed. Sealant strip visible in
Figures 1a and 1b not visible, here obscured by metal visor perimeter strip seen in 
Figure 1a.
FIGURE 3. Figure 3a: Pilot Opening Visor c.20 minutes Into Flight. Figure 3b: Pilot 
Consuming Xylose (Sugar) Pill.
a
b
FIGURE 4. Pilot Closing Visor After Consuming Xylose (Sugar) Pill While in Orbit With 
Hard Vacuum Beyond Pressurized Cabin Hull.
FIGURE 5. Pilot Reporting “Roger, retros are firing.” at Entry Interface (Mission 
Elapsed time 04:33:09), With Hard Vacuum Outside Pressure Cabin and Helmet Visor 
Open, Altitude c. 360,000' MSL.
FIGURE 6. Pilot Reporting “A real fireball outside,” During Reentry (Mission Elapsed 
time 04:43:47), With Hard Vacuum Outside Pressure Cabin and Helmet Visor Open, 
Altitude >100,000' MSL.
FIGURE 7. Pilot Reporting “My condition is good but that was a real fireball outside, 
boy!” During Reentry (Mission Elapsed time 04:47:55), With Hard Vacuum Outside 
Pressure Cabin and Helmet Visor Open, Altitude c. 100,000' MSL.
FIGURE 8. Pilot Reporting “Altimeter off the peg indicating eight zero thousand.” 
During Reentry (Mission Elapsed time 04:48:07), With <0.0psi Ambient Pressure 
Outside Pressure Cabin and Helmet Visor Open, Altitude 80,000' MSL.
FIGURE 9. Pilot Reporting “...drogue [parachute] came out at 30,000...” During Reentry 
(Mission Elapsed time 04:49:20), With 'Only Just Physiologically Safe' Ambient 
Pressure of  4.3psi Outside Pressure Cabin and Helmet Visor Open, Altitude c. 30,000' 
MSL.
FIGURE 10. Mercury-Redstone 3 Pilot Reporting Altitide of 50,000' MSL During Reentry 
With Helmet Visor Closed, Black Sealing Ring Obscured by Metal Visor Rim.
